Thus, Kant does not address the issue of the mental and potentially private character of our cognitive activities by re-arranging the relationship between processes in the inner realm and external processes. Neither is it crucial to emphasize that some of the activities also have an external use; this is the case with concept application in linguistic communication. Instead, Kant relies on a modal concept, in particular on the concept of a conditional necessity. If we humans have certain cognitive achievements, then certain functional roles must be fulfilled. This implies that specific rules are effective in relation to our mind. The cognitive activities can then be characterized as the very processes that instantiate these necessary conditions. This way of justifying claims about our cognitive apparatus is still distinct from the core arguments of the first Critique, such as the deduction argument. In the reasoning I suggested here, object reference is taken for granted. The assumption that we refer to objects is understood as a contingent premise without further justification. In contrast, the deduction argument tries to show that object reference is implied in the possibility of ascribing thoughts to oneself.
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Finally, it is worth mentioning that Kant's reference to logical and cognitive activities is not based on introspection -nor does his account just put features forward which also would be available by introspection and thus independently of Kant's own methodological procedure. For, (1) inner sense, too, provides us only with appearances; in addition, he calls the consciousness of our activities frequently weak or dark (e.g. A103-104) . (2) Conditions for the possibility of representing need not be part of what is represented. (3) Introspection cannot ground the conditional necessity Kant is looking for. (4) Kant does not describe the activities as we experience them but by characterizing their functional role.
3. Do all acts of the understanding belong to the same type?
Let us suppose that Kant can justify taking up logical and cognitive activities at all; thus let us suppose that the strategy using self-directed transcendental arguments is successful.
The obvious next step is to analyze how Kant spells out his model of these activities. The Kantian classification of logic is derived from the 18 th century tradition. The classification distinguishes between the acts of concept formation, judging and inferring. I will rely mostly on his account of concept formation and judging. In addition, I will take up the activity of synthetically integrating the manifold of representations on the level of intuitions. This activity is not a topic of the Kantian logic. It is at the centre of his theoretical philosophy. The activity of synthetic integration is meant to allow for the fact that mental representations can represent complex, three-dimensional and temporally extended objects. Since these objects are also the point of relation of our logical states, the activity of synthesizing is tied to our logical activities as well.
of a plurality of logical and cognitive activities? Or is Kant's claim rather that we are ultimately just dealing with one uniform type of an activity of the understanding?
There are different ways in which the three processes emphasized could all belong to one and the same type of activity. The first option is that the same activity of the understanding is processing on different cognitive levels. This could be the case with the activities of synthesis and of judging. The first one operates at the level of intuition whereas the second one relates to concepts, that is, general representations. By claiming that there is just one uniform type of activity Kant would claim the following: The activity of synthetically integrating the visual information I receive in a sequence of perceiving my environment would be the same as the activity involved in judging.
Another option to interpret the claim that there is just one uniform type of activity is the following: The very same activity could be described from two different angles (both related to the same cognitive level). This could be the case with the activities of concept formation and of judging. Looking from one angle, the activity could be described as the process of judging, which consists in attributing a general mark to an object. Looking from the other angle, the process would constitute a representation as a general representation in the first instance. Then, the activity of judging would be identified with the act of forming the concept that partakes in the judgment. This way of spelling out the different options shows that they amount to two different claims. There is evidence for both claims in Kant.
I already mentioned Kant's claim that "the very same actions through which it (the understanding -US) brings the logical form of judgment into concepts" are also effective in establishing "the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general" (B105/A79). In addition, Kant writes in the chapter on "The Logical Use of the Understanding in General": "We can (...) trace all actions of the understanding back to judgment, so that the understanding in general can be represented as a faculty for judging" (B94/A69). This suggests that the other logical actions -namely concept formation and interference -can be spelled out in terms of judgment, which corresponds to the second of the two claims mentioned above. Thus, overall, we would be dealing with one unified type of action:
judgment. This would be the key to Kant's philosophy of mind.
However, there are objections to both claims. First, I would like to consider the claim that the very same activity that establishes the logical form of judgment also synthesizes the manifold at the level of intuitions. In this context, it is important to note that the logical form of judgment is primarily based on the activity of subsuming. Suppose I judge on the ground of the mark that this small, red, insect-like animal has eight legs that it is an arachnid. In this judgment, the concept of a mite (this is the animal we are dealing with) and the concept of arachnid are related by subordination; the generality of the concept 'arachnid' is potentially larger than the generality of 'mite'. This claim can also be formulated in a corresponding way in terms of the marks the judgment represents the object as having. The marks of being insect-like and having eight legs are subordinated to the mark of being an arachnid; according to Kant, marks are subordinated " insofar as one mark is represented in the thing only by means of the other" (AA 9, 59).
When we run through the given material and thereby synthesize our representations, the underlying relations are different. In this case, the representations are at the same level of generality. If one concedes that the term 'mark' can be applied at the level of intuition at all, then we are dealing with coordinated marks. The front and the rear side of the animal would be an example for features of this type. 12 Given the difference one may wonder whether it is indeed the same activity which establishes both relations.
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Identifying the activity of concept formation with judging is similarly problematic. This becomes obvious once Kant introduces the distinction between reflection and determination. 15 Reflection is a logical activity that ascends from the individual to the general. Determination proceeds in the opposite direction, thus applying the general representation either to an object or to the intuition corresponding to it. Like our aesthetic response to the object, concept formation centres on reflection alone. In judging, in turn, the issue of how I want to determine the object is dominant -on this topic, see also section 4b.
Thus, both claims underlying Kant's thesis that there is just one uniform type of the activity of the understanding turned out to be controversial. In the following I will rely on 12 I assume here that the operation of synthesis as represented in the sections 1-3 of the A-deduction (A 98-A110) is primarily concerned with representing individual objects and the task of tracking their identity through time. For a different reading, see Longuenesse 1998:49. 13 A standard reply to this objection is the following: When we synthesize our representations and thereby relate coordinated marks, we also subsume the bundle we have produced under a concept (e.g. the concept of a substance). However, this claim does not establish that the activities in question are identical. That they still may be different can be shown by the following possibility: There may be an empirical judgment which establishes the relationship of subsumption between two concepts without thereby synthesizing the coordinated marks of the underlying object -apart from those represented in the subject concept. Performing the synthesis would be different from this particular act of judging. Therefore, both activities can still be distinct even if they turn out to be correlated. 14 A negative reply to this question obviously affects the success of the "metaphysical deduction": Is the claim that merely the same faculty and its norms (and not also the same actions) operate both at the intuitive level and the judgmental level still sufficient to introduce the transcendental content and thus the categories? 15 AA 20, 211 and AA 5, 179.
the assumption that there is a plurality of correlated activities, since this is the weaker claim.
Five Challenges for Kant's Model of Concept Formation, Judgment and Synthesis
In the next step I want to look more closely at the Kantian descriptions of the activities in question. I want to point out that there are internal problems in how, according to Kant, the activities are supposed to accomplish their task. In addition, there are tensions in Kant's description of the relationship between different activities.
Overall, I want to point out five problems for Kant's theory. Since Kant's account of concepts plays a crucial role in formulating these problems I will begin by analysing this account. The Jäsche-Logic explains the activity of concept formation in the following way:
"To make concepts out of representations one must be able to compare, to reflect and to abstract, for these three logical operations of the understanding are essential and universal conditions for generation of every concept whatsoever. I see, e.g., a spruce, a willow and a linden. By first comparing these objects with one another I note that they are different from another in regard to the trunk, the branches and the leaves, etc.; but next I reflect on that which they have in common among themselves, trunk, branches and leaves themselves, and I abstract from the quantity, the figure, etc., of these; thus I acquire a concept of a tree." (AA 9, 94) Hannah Ginsborg 16 has outlined two internal problems in Kant's account of concept formation.
The first (1) Ginsborg's own approach to solve these problems relates to Hume. According to Hume, concepts are based on our having the capacity to call objects to mind which are similar to those that I represent right now (Ginsborg 2006:44ff.) . Unlike Hume, Ginsborg suggests that we take our modes of association as having normative significance (Ginsborg 2006:51) . In this context, she introduces the idea of a primitive normativity. Her approach seems to imply that all the rules governing concepts acquire the status of primitive normativity. In the following, I will suggest a reading which attributes primitive normativity only to the rules of rationality. Discussing Ginsborg's highly innovative approach in detail is beyond the scope of this paper. Doing so would demand a sketch of her reading of the Critique of Judgment as well. (4) The question arises of how exactly concepts are correlated to the synthesis underlying intuition. According to Kant, this synthesis plays a crucial role in the explanation of how intuitions are intentionally directed to objects. The question does not concern primarily the well-known relation between category concepts and synthesis. Rather, the focus is on empirical concepts such as the concept of a tree in Kant's example. On the one hand, Kant's description of how we generate an empirical concept seems to presuppose that we already refer to objects given in a well-ordered way -for example to the spruce, the linden and the willow, or to three arachnids. If the description presupposes reference to these objects, then it also presupposes the synthesis involved in representing these objects. On the other hand one may wonder whether the synthesis can yield the representation of objects which are both stable and have clearly delineated empirical boundaries if one does not take for granted that the empirical concepts are already available; it seems as if the empirical concepts already have to be applied in the synthesis. Once again, considering the role of the concepts in the genetic process reveals a circularity problem.
Finally, there is a fifth (5) critical question. This question refers to the relationship between judgment and synthesis. According to Kant, judgment and synthesis are also interlocking. In order to understand the fifth question one has to bear in mind that an essential feature of judgment is articulating a relation to objectivity. Judgment therefore is distinct from a way of combining representations which merely articulates a subjective impression of how something appears to me individually: "That is the aim of the copula is in them: to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective."
(B141-142) Kant's standard example is the sentence: the body is heavy. As is well known to readers of Kant, the reference to objectivity articulated in a judgment is grounded on the synthesis of intuition, insofar as this synthesis itself is tied to the unity of apperception as a source of objectivity. Judgments are then "nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception." (B141) But is it conceivable that the relation to the objective sphere provided by the synthesis has to be established in each case of judgment? Do I perform the synthesis by judging? This question is particularly important if one takes the presentation of judgment in the Jäsche-Logic into consideration as well. According to the Jäsche-Logic, a judgment primarily maps a specific combination of concepts -it is a "representation of a relation among them" (AA 9, 101). However, we know already that the concepts which are supposed to be combined in a judgment presuppose an underlying synthesis. Thus it is impossible that the synthesis is established by the judgment in the first place, as Kant seems to claim.
The five critical worries provide reasons for focusing on Kant's theory of concepts despite Kant's own emphasis on the primacy of judgment among the logical and cognitive activities. For all the problems mentioned relate primarily to the role of concepts and to their generation. Thus in the following, I will pursue the unusual strategy of reconstructing Kant's account of the activities of the mind starting from the issue of concept formation.
5. What fixes which marks we must select in order to form the relevant concept? Several efforts to solve the first problem a. Longuenesse's reference to schemata as mediating between concepts and perception I will begin by discussing two prominent efforts to solve the first problem. Béatrice
Longuenesse's effort is the most well known. 18 It has been frequently discussed.
According to Longuenesse, the comparison at the beginning of concept formation cannot In addition, schemata cannot reasonably be conceived of as entities which are general just in the same way as concepts are general. According to this approach, the only difference between schemata and concepts would be that schemata are immediately involved in Due to its two-fold difference to both the concept and the image, the schema is a procedure (or a representation of a procedure) which cannot be reduced to any particular content of either thought or perception. The implicit character follows as a conclusion from this reasoning. This is why Kant calls the "schematism of the understanding" "a hidden art in the depth of the human soul, whose operations we will hardly ever divine from nature and lay before our eyes. " (B180-181/A141) Once again Kant is drawing on the parallel to the power of judgment for the exercise of which no general rule can be given.
Understood this way, it is doubtful whether schemata can reasonably be considered as objects of comparison at all as Longuenesse suggests. This is particularly doubtful given the fact that the concepts corresponding to these schemata are not yet supposed to be given to us. In this situation, it is not at all obvious how it happens that we generate this particular concept (tree) rather than another concept -a concept that would structure the present and future input in a different way. In addition, the previous step of the reasoning has revealed that introducing schemata as mediating between intuitive and conceptual levels does not solve the problem. Claiming that we cannot step behind the conceptual level at all becomes more appealing given the negative results so far. This claim can be based on Kant's well known thesis that cognition always has two sources, it is always also Therefore the interpreter's task is to read judging in such a way that the actions of concept formation can be identified within the process of judging. Sebastian Rödl is among those interpreters who endorse the strategy just sketched. I take up his reading of reflection as a crucial example:
that the representation is possible in various ways." A straightforward way to account for this possibility is the following: Given one representation, we can access another representation nearby in the realm of possibilities by means of association. This association can provide us with a starting point for concept formation if the association proceeds in such a way that a mark present in the given representation is also taken to be present in the representation we associate with it: 'For example, one sees a sapling, so one has the representation of a tree; an elongated rectangle makes on think of a square. A unicorn is a horse, where the horn has been taken from other animals'. The "rule" Kant is talking about is the rule governing the process of association; what is "general in the rule" is the very feature the association transmits from one representation to the other. The procedure of association is merely part of the psychology involved in the theory of concept formation. However, this psychological process should not be confused with the necessary operations of synthesis, as Longuenesse does.
"According to Kant "general representation" means "reflected representation". Thus, I
start with reflecting. In reflecting I look at a spruce in respect of what it has in common with a linden, a willow and other trees. This means I take the spruce to be a tree. I can make this explicit in judging "The spruce is a tree"." 
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Kant emphasizes that it is only in the case of the concept of nature that reflection already implies determination (AA 20, 212) . This holds because the concept of nature constitutes the corresponding area of investigation; therefore, it has always already been applied. In all other cases, the activity of reflection which is directed towards a "possible" concept, or a concept that can be 'found', does not yet include the performance of determination. The sample judgment in the quotation from Sebastian Rödl stands primarily for the application of a concept and thus for the process of determination: The concept tree is applied to a spruce. The activity of reflection seems to be both presupposed and by-passed. The judgment "the spruce is a tree" is certainly not a good starting point for making explicit what reflection is. The spruce has a trunk." (Rödl 2001:433) Once again, the dominant focus seems to be on the determination, in particular on the rule "What belongs to or contradicts a higher concept also belongs to or contradicts all lower concepts that are contained under those higher ones." (AA 9, 98) Again, this does not seem to be abstraction, because abstraction is concerned with the question which marks the concept 'tree' includes. This seems to be presupposed in the syllogism. Comparison is finally rendered as " (1) "Prior to all analysis of our representations these must first be given, and no concept can arise analytically as far as the content is concerned. The synthesis of the manifold, however, (whether it be given empirically or a priori) first brings forth a cognition, which to be sure may initially still be raw and confused, and thus in need of analysis; yet the synthesis alone is that which properly collects the elements for cognitions and unifies them into a certain content..." (B103/A77) Thus, concepts can arise analytically as far as their form, that is, insofar as their generality is concerned, whereas it is impossible that they can arise analytically with respect to their content. The synthesis is the very procedure which "collects the elements for cognitions".
The Metaphysics Mrongrovius adds to this observation: "From pure sensations one cannot characteristics, (2) The spruce has a trunk with such and such characteristics, (3) The willow has a trunk with such and such characteristics, (C) Trees have a trunk." (Rödl 2001:434) However, it is hard to see how comparison as focusing on both what objects have in common and on their difference could be rendered as a syllogism. Rödl's second syllogism rather seems to stand for abstraction (if it can be related to one of the three activities at all).
make any concepts or communicate them to others (...) But one can make concepts from the synthesis of perception." (AA 29, 794) .
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This claim leads directly to the forth problem mentioned on the list: Can the synthetic activity establish sufficiently stable and clearly delineated boundaries in the realm of objects without presupposing empirical concepts? Is an activity (implicitly) directed solely by the category concepts in a position to determine, which empirical marks belong to each other? In other words: Does the synthetic activity have a sufficient selective power in order to allow for a representation of distinct empirical objects? I will outline why an affirmative answer to these questions is plausible.
First one has to bear in mind that we are dealing with a synthetic activity guided by the concept of an object in its relation to figurations in space and time. If the cognitions in question represent the object in this way, the following must be true: "insofar as they are to relate to an object our cognitions must also necessarily agree with each other in relation to it, i.e., they must have that unity that constitutes the concept of an object."(A104/A105)
Thus, cognition will represent objects as having marks which -once we have conceptualized the marks -cannot yield contradictory judgments. However, this is just a minimal condition. In addition, the demand of unification relates particularly to space and spatial features. Therefore, the understanding is directed towards objects which are unified in space. These are objects which occupy an enclosed spatial area. They can be composed as having sides which connect to each other. In our access to the world we will not give priority to the referents of what we nowadays call mass terms 26 nor to objects which are discontinuous in space (or in time) and therefore disparate. Finally, we have to take into account that the understanding will follow a pattern in its procedure of establishing unity that fulfils basic norms of (economic) rationality. 27 The understanding is defined as the rational capacity. This aspect of the meaning of 'understanding' is obvious in the corresponding German term 'Verstand'. The constraints of rationality in question do not primarily apply to one isolated instance of perceiving one's environment. The constraints 25 In this context one has to bear in mind that the synthesis is closely related to the category concepts. In consequence, my approach implies that category concepts differ from empirical concepts both in status and in the role they play in the cognitive process. I do not think that this implication causes problems. In particular, I do not think that a claim from the Jäsche-Logic, according to which the form of a concept is always produced (AA 9, 93), undermines my approach. Even in the case of synthesis, the activity itself comes first. We have to reflect on this activity in order to form the category concepts as explicitly present representations. On this topic, see B103-104/A78. In addition, the logic Philippi claims that the understanding acquires pure concepts "by paying attention to his own procedure on the occasion of experience" (AA 24, 452) . 26 A standard example is 'water'. On mass terms, see Quine 1960:91ff. 27 Economic rationality is understood here as aiming at a mini-max relationship balancing unity and diversity. Its most explicit treatment already relates to a higher level: Economic rationality underlies the possibility of having a network of concepts.
matters for this example as well. In the case of wooden material highly diverse items would be conceived as a unity. But not integrating our representation of a small tree in the same way as we integrate other perceptions of trees in a sequence of perceiving them would render our perception too disparate despite a high degree of similarity in the input.
Both cases violate the principles of (economic) rationality. One can explain in the same way why we do not include the soil the tree is growing in or the ivy surrounding it in what we perceive as the relevant unity when we face a tree. The configuration of trees is not always connected to these features which again concerns the issue of economy. In addition, the soil is not an enclosed body.
These examples show the following: Aiming at a unified object, or -formulated in Kant's own terminology -being guided by the category of substance in relation to space and time does provide the synthetic activity with selective power. The synthetic activity understood this way contributes to structuring empirical objects in perception. The activity allows us to explain why we can perceive something as an enclosed object even if the corresponding 28 The constraints of rationality are meant to respond to a worry about a potential gap that could open up if the reading of the deduction would rely only on category concepts. Stefanie Grüne fills this gap by introducing dark empirical concepts as sharing important features with mechanisms of association (Grüne 2009:232ff.) . The advantage of the constraints of rationality is to be found in the fact that they can be traced back directly to the understanding without introducing additional empirical assumptions. Like Grüne, I assume that the mechanism operates recursively in a sequence of applications. 29 Once we have concepts, the principles of rationality guide us by developing the architecture of our conceptual systems. See Kant's comments on the 'principle of reflection' (AA 20, 211 ff. Let us suppose that synthetic activity can provide representations of enclosed objects by proceeding in a way that conforms to the category concepts. Within the process of representing, the synthetic activities provide boundaries in drawing these boundaries. This makes plausible why it is likely that in concept formation we all take up this set of properties or distinctions rather than others. However, this reasoning does not contribute to solving the second internal problem of concept formation. Using again the standard example, the problem can be spelled out in the following way: Kant's presentation of the concept 'tree' presupposes that we already possess the sub-concepts 'trunk', 'branches'
and 'leaves'. I don't think we can address this problem by emphasizing (1) that only complex concepts are tied to sub-concepts and (2) that there must be a basic level of simple concepts which have to be explained in a different way. For accepting this suggestion implies endorsing a specific model of how we humans actually generate concepts. One would have to claim that starting from childhood we would as a matter of fact proceed from concepts of what is simple to concepts of what is composed. However, this is an implausible empirical claim. It seems more convincing to assume that humans deal from the very beginning primarily with the complex objects of everyday life. They immediately form concepts of these objects. These concepts in turn are themselves internally complex. Kant's focus on synthesis conforms well to this common sense approach.
Thus, the second problem can't be solved by using the concepts 'complex' and 'simple'.
Instead, one has to refer directly to the concepts 'individual' and 'general'. In order to do so I would like to make a background assumption explicit: I do not assume that in 31 It is important to note that so far I have just explained why certain features are unified as belonging to one object. Thereby, I
have not yet explained the generality of the concept.
in each case perceive the characteristics in objects as being general ones, thus from the point of view that they allow for multiple instantiation. Once I possess the concept, the mark of the object presents itself to me as general.
(However, it is important to note that my gaze is not always focused on correspondences present anywhere in the surfaces that are given to us. But does this not mean that we already have to presuppose the concept, because the individual instances -the different shades on the surfaces -do not fix where the process of abstraction is heading to?
Kant's approach to addressing this issue is similar to his effort at solving the first problem of concept formation by referring to the process of synthesis. Once again, the active determination of the understanding is the key to the solution. What it is we pay attention to in comparing and reflecting and what it is that we thereby neglect (such as the differences in the shades of colour) creates a common feature from our point of view. This common feature would not be present in the merely given material independently from our access to it. 33 Unlike synthesis, the activity involved in our seeing common features does not proceed in a way that is governed all the way down by necessity. 34 This would not be desirable anyway, since the conception should allow for variations in how we carve up our concepts. But the activity isn't unregulated or arbitrary either. As an activity of reflection, it is guided by the corresponding principle of reflection: "that for all things in nature empirically determinate concepts can be found", as Kant says (AA 20, 211) . In addition, the principles of economy always direct us in building a system of concepts.
Furthermore, the concepts of identity and similarity must be present in the activity as well -these concepts must be present in reflection in a way that corresponds to the presence of the category concepts in the process of synthesizing intuitions. Kant does not tell us much about this last issue. The Kantian distinction between concepts that are objects of reflection ("reflektierte Begriffe") and concepts involved in the process of reflecting ("reflektierende Begriffe") may indicate that he had concepts such as identity and similarity in mind. than other representations. However, this comparative use of the term 'abstract' seems to miss an absolute distinction between abstract and concrete which is present in Frege and post-Fregean philosophy. According to the post-Fregean tradition, thoughts understood as the content of sentences, and the concepts that contribute to them are abstract in the absolute sense, whereas spatio-temporal objects and their features are concrete.
The charge of not being able to account for the right meaning of 'abstract' is closely related to other critical questions concerning Kant's theory of concept formation: Why is the product of abstraction also not once again just singular? How can it be more than the result of a function based on just these very specific sample cases (that is, this particular spruce, willow and linden)? If so, how is it possible that this product puts reasonable constraints on the application of the concept in the future? I will briefly sketch three features of the Kantian account which contribute to answering these questions. In a final, seventh step I would like to address briefly the relationship between concepts and judgments -as is well known, judgments are at the centre of Kant's own presentation of his theory. The previous step has already revealed that successful concept formation demands the subsequent use of concepts in judgments. I now want to argue that the opposite relation holds, too: The possibility of judgment also depends on the process of concept formation as described in the logic. Against this claim two passages from the 41 The role of attention becomes more prominent in the contemporary philosophy of mind, too: In his Simon Lectures, John Campbell, for example, classified attention as being part of the 'hard facts of semantics'. I would like to suggest a different reading of the Kantian passage: A logical combination of originally merely subjective states only qualifies as a judgment, that is: as something that transcends the individual person and her subjectivity, if it is bound to the objective unity of apperception and the synthesis underlying it. 42 Thus the relation to objectivity established by the synthesis explains why judgments and the concepts that partake in them are not merely private even though they are grounded on mental representations. Kant can therefore respond to the Fregean challenge. The claim that our cognitive activities establish a relation to objectivity and thus allow for the communicability of the content of our mental representations is only an apparent paradox.
The complex discussion can be summarized as follows: (1) Kant's emphasis on the active role of the understanding is not itself a problem; for Kant, it is rather a tool to solve several problems surrounding concept formation and judgment. (2) These problems can be solved precisely because we are not dealing with just one type of action, but with a plurality of different activities which interact in an organic way. They contribute to the Kantian image of the purposiveness of our mind. As the cognizing being in question, we can't help assuming that our mind is organized in a purposive way. This assumption, hardly ever spelled out explicitly, is the keystone of Kant's reasoning. 
